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MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
A QUIET REVOLUTION
SEYMOUR RUBIN*
INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' negotiated in
1947, has long been considered the cornerstone of the world trading system,
at least as between so-called market economies. The GATT itself was to have
been the central element in an International Trade Organization [ITO]. The
Charter for the proposed ITO was drafted by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment, convened in Havana in the latter part of 1947.2
The ITO never came into effect, however, at least partially because the
United States, which had been its principal sponsor, failed to ratify it for a
combination of reasons. Some of the reasons for this failure were: dissatisfac-
tion with certain clauses in the ITO Charter dealing with private foreign
investment;3 protectionist sentiment; and sensibilities related to national
sovereignty.4 Had the ITO come into effect, arguably many of the changes in
the economies of the world which have undermined the GATT could have
been better accommodated.
* Executive Vice President and Executive Director, American Society of Inter-
national Law; Professor of Law, American University; LL.B., LL.M., Harvard. Member,
Inter-American Juridical Committee.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 194u,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The GATT
has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version of the agreement
is contained in 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (1969) [hereinafter cited as BISD].
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employement, Havana Charter for
an International Trade Organization and Final Act and Related Documents (Havana,
Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947 - March 24, 1948), U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4/ (1948), reprinted in U.S.
Department of State Pub. No. 3117 (April 1947) Ihereinafter cited as Havana Charter
for an I.T.O.].
3. The subject of private foreign investment - providing some protection for in-
vestors while satisfying the often competing nationalist sentiments of the host coun-
tries - is still the raison d'etre of conferences in the United Nations Commission on
Transnational Corporations, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, in various regional and bilateral talks, and in General Assembly and United
Nations Economic and Social Council resolutions.
4. See R.N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 375-378 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as R. N. GARDNER]; See also W. Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, 16 PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 11-21 (1952).
(221)
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Within the GATT, the fundamental guiding principle was that of
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment [hereinafter MFN], basically a
principle of nondiscrimination. There have traditionally been two forms of
MFN: conditional and unconditional.5 Until the late 18th century, uncon-
ditional MFN - in which MFN is given to third nations without the
requirement of a like concession - had been prevalent in world practice.
However, the United States, in its first treaty as an independent nation, in
1778, agreed to grant to France, the treaty partner, any concession which the
United States granted to any third nation, but provided that if any measure
of compensation was obtained, similar compensation would be required as a
condition of granting the concession to France.6 It is of some interest to note
that the reasons for this conditional MFN - which was largely adopted in
Latin America - were mainly based on the fact that the United States of
that day was a less developed nation, being largely a supplier of raw
materials, heavily dependent on the more developed nations of Europe for
industrial goods, capital and technology. In those circumstances, conditional
MFN was found to be a useful tool. In the 1860s, Great Britain, which had -
as a bastion of "free trade" - never entirely adopted conditional MFN,
concluded a treaty which granted unconditional MFN to France.7 Finding
that unconditional MFN was not to its advantage when the French obligation
was for conditional MFN, the British began a drive to conclude a series of
treaties providing for unconditional MFN. Thereafter, the popularity of
unconditional MFN rose. It was the mode generally in use thereafter. The
United States provided legislative authority for unconditional MFN in its
1933 Tariff Act, and commited itself to unconditional MFN in the 1934 Trade
Agreements Act. As a major proponent of the GATT, the United States was a
leader in making unconditional MFN a "cornerstone" of the GATT, and
including it in Article I.
Article I of the GATT was intended to reverse the spread of preferential
trading arrangements which had characterized the period between the two
World Wars. The Smoot-Hawley tariff,9 enacted by the United States in 1930,
5. See S. RuBIN, The Most Favored Nation Clause and the Generalized System of
Preference, Cuarto Curso de Derecho Internacionale, Organized by the Interamerican
Juridical Committee, 339 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The MFN Clause and the GSP.
6. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, art. II, entered into force July 17, 1778, 8 Stat.
12; T.S. No. 83.
7. Treaty of Commerce between France and Great Britain, art. XIX, signed at
Paris, 23 Jan., 1860, 121 Parry's T.S. 243.
8. An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § § 1351--1354 (1976).
9. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
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had engendered the British system of imperial preference."° The GATT was
specifically designed to arrest and reverse this trend. But, the GATT was far
from wholly successful, because of deviations or exceptions openly condoned,
because of the rising desire for "special and preferential treatment" on the
part of developing nations; and because of often unacknowledged but
nevertheless effective methods of restricting trade and of granting preferen-
tial treatment.
The operating thesis of the GATT was its commitment to progressive
reduction of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Article I of the
GATT" set the tone for the document. It enunciated the obligation to grant
most-favored-nation treatment to all signatories - an obligation to extend to
any member those advantages which a signatory granted to any third
nation." This was the rock upon which the system was founded. It is a rock
which in recent years, however, has begun to crumble.
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter MTN] concluded in
1979 in Geneva (the so-called Tokyo Round)i3 constitute, within the
frame-work of negotiations administered by the GATT, a reasonably
successful attempt to maintain liberal trade principles on the one hand, while
departing significantly from MFN on the other hand. The broad consequences
of these divergent trends are still difficult to assess. But it is clear that the
GATT, and the concepts which underlay it, can no longer be considered as the
point of reference for international trade, however much importance it may
still retain.
For the world at large, including the developing countries, this departure
from unconditional MFN and the GATT is an important development.
Though initially the majority of subscribers to the GATT were the
industrialized nations, it has grown from its original twenty-three members"
to an organization of eighty-four members, with another twenty-one coun-
tries associated with it." The GATT has, since its inception, sponsored seven
10. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 251 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WORLD TRADE].
11. GAIT, supra note 1, art. I.
12. Id.
13. Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, H. R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTNI.
14. GATT, Final Act, Geneva, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947); See also 55 U.N.T.S. 188
(1947).
15. GAI Press Release, GATT/1215, June 9, 1978, announcing Surinam as a
Contracting Party, bringing the total to 84 members.
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"rounds" of tariff and trade barrier reductions,'6 with considerable success.
Tariffs have been lowered to such an extent that the principal subject at the
last round - the MTN - was nontariff, rather than tariff, barriers. The
GATT has also served as a forum for discussion of international trade
issues." The GATT had the further advantage of having been a flexible
instrument. Special provisions relating to the problems of development and
to the concerns of the developing countries were included from the outset.'"
Part IV of the GATT,'9 added some years after its initial negotiation, dealt
specifically with those questions.
Dissatisfaction with the GATT has arisen not only because of the
inadequacy of its rules and principles, but in large part because of the
tendency of many states to either ignore or bend those rules. Despite its
infirmities, the GATT has been a statement of belief in the virtues of an open
international economic system, and has thus played a large part in the
expansion of world trade - and investment - which has characterized the
decades since the end of World War II.
Though the MTN, or Tokyo Round, formally reaffirms the validity of the
GATT principles, it seems evident that there has been a major departure
from many of those principles. Foremost among the compromised principles
is that of general acceptance of most-favored-nation treatment.
1. History of Exceptions to MFN Treatment.
There have been exceptions to the MFN principles from the outset ° -
exceptions made for preGATT situations;" for customs unions and free trade
areas;" and for balance of payments quotas. 3 The major exception to MFN of
16. The locations and dates for these rounds are as follows: 1 - Geneva, Switzer-
land 1947; 2 - Annecy, France 1948; 3 - Torquay, England 1950; 4 - Geneva 1956; 5
- "Dillon Round," Geneva 1960-61; 6 - "Kennedy Round," Geneva 1964-67; 7 -
"Tokyo Round," Geneva 1973-79. The first six rounds are briefly summarized in J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 473 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS].
17. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 16, at 398.
18. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVIII.
19. Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce
a Part IV on Trade and Development, entered into force June 27, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1977,
T.I.A.S. No. 6139, 572 U.N.T.S. 320. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
20. See The MFN Clause and the GSP, supra note 5, at 346 et. seq.
21. GATT, supra note 1, art. 1 § § 2-4, and annex A-G, to which those sections
refer. For example, by virtue of art. 2 § b, and annex D, the U.S. maintained its special
tariff arrangement with the Philippines which had been established in 1946 to ease the
Philippine economy into independence.
22. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV.
23. Id., arts. XII and XIV.
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interest to developing countries in particular is the Generalized System of
Preferences [hereinafter GSP]P4 now a generally accepted discrimination in
favor of developing nations, as indeed is the whole of Part IV of the GATT."
These latter deviations from the MFN principle were added to the original
GATT structure, in response to the increasingly adamant claims that
nondiscrimination in international trade is in fact a form of discrimination
against the less developed and less industrialized nations. However debatable
are the virtues of the GSP, 6 the fact is that, both because of acceptance of
GSP as a principle of equity, and because of the widespread proliferation of
preferential arrangements not condoned by the GATT - it underlines the
progressive deterioration of the MFN principle. Nevertheless, and despite the
exceptions, until the MTN, it has been possible to argue that MFN, at least
for the industrialized nations, remained an article of faith, deviations from
which were perhaps condoned but seldom approved, and generally regarded
as exceptions.
The Codes which have been negotiated in the MTN27 have demonstrated
that there has been a shift in perception among the industrialized nations as
to the virtues of most-favored-nation treatment. The developing nations had
originally taken the initiative in making the point that MFN treatment was
not suitable to their needs. In addition to their argument that the GATT
terms of trade had been set when their participation in world councils was
limited or nonexistent, they argued that nondiscriminatory or equal treat-
ment, as exemplified in MFN, would not offset disabilities resulting from
their long colonial status. Hence, much of their effort in past years has been
to obtain special and not equal treatment. Special and preferential arrange-
ments were thought to be necessary not only to overcome established
inequalities but also to compensate for weaknesses in the economies of the
developing nations, which in turn were the asserted consequence of long
periods of dependency and the overhang of colonialism.
The result of this pressure, as demonstrated in the MTN Codes, has been
a change in underlying convictions among the developed nations themselves.
Those nations had for some time recognized the case for "special and
differentiated" treatment for developing nations. The Codes now openly
acknowledge that differentiated treatment may have its attractions for the
24. GATT Doc. L/3545, BISD 18th Supp. (April 1972).
25. GATT, supra note 19.
26. For the opinion that the benefits of the GSP are still far from being proved, See
RUBIN, International Trade Law: Recent Developments, 1 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 127, 132
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Recent Trade Developements].
27. MTN, supra note 13.
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developed nations as well as for developing nations." The implications of this
change have still to be fully realized.
It is not unlikely that this basic change in perception, exemplified in the
MTN Codes (and especially those on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties,
and on Governmental Procurement) will have substantial consequences for
both developing and developed nations.
2. The Proliferation of Special Arrangements Under the GATT
It has recently been said that "The post-war trade system . .. is
dying." Others have made that same point. In his book, John Evans had
some years ago pointed out . . . that the system of trade and economic
institutions which emerged after World War II was under strain, and the
GATT1 - and its trade rules - was not least among those undergoing
resultant change." The causes of this "decline" were many and varied.
Some of these causes were in fact what might be called birth defects.
Among these was that the GATT was originally designed merely as a broad
trade agreement - a set of rules - not as an international organization. The
GATT was to have been administered by a new international institution, the
International Trade Organization (ITO)." Within the ITO there were to be, in
addition to the trade rules incorporated in the GATT, rules having to do with
other importantly related issues: restrictive business practices; employment
and labor; commodity agreements; and rules for administration, including
rules and procedures for resolution of disputes.2 When the ITO failed to
obtain international acceptance - an eventuality for which the United
States, which had been an original and strong proponent, must take its full
share of responsibility - the tripod of international economic institutions
(IMF-IBRD-ITO) which had been envisaged33 lost one of its essential legs. The
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, with its sister institutions, remained; but there was no
overall institution in which trade and trade-related issues could be discussed,
on the basis of at least generally accepted principles.
28. See H. R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979).
29. See GRAHAM, Revolution in Trade Politics, 36 FOREIuN POLICY 49 (Fall 1979).
30. J. EVANS, KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF THE
GATT
31. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 16, at 397.
32. See Havana Charter for an I.T.O., supra note 2.
33. See Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years After, 23 STAN. L. REV.
235, 245 (Jan. 1971).
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The GATT was, largely through the ingenuity of its extremely capable
first Secretary General, Sir Eric Wyndham White, able to survive and to play
a major and beneficial role over the years. It was able to expand, from its
original limited membership of mainly industrialized nations," to an
institution to which most of the market economies of the world, including a
large number of developing nations, adhered.' It found, indeed, formulas for
associating a few non-market economies.H But institutionally it suffered not
only from lack of formal and definitive ratification - it is even to this day in
effect via a Protocol of Provisional Application 37- but also from compromises
within the allegedly fundamental principle of open and nondiscriminatory
trade.
One major exception to the principle of nondiscrimination was that
which permitted institutions like the European Economic Community (EEC)
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to accord special customs
and tariff treatment to members of those institutions but to deny equal
treatment to other nations, members of GATT, but not members of either
EEC or EFTA." The rationale for the exception was clear. The theory
advanced was that economic unification among member states of customs
unions would bring benefits not merely to those members but to those outside
the system. A large, unified, trading entity - the EEC, for example -
would, it was argued, bring about a larger volume of world trade, much as
the nonexistence of tariff and trade barriers among the states of the United
States of America created a trading entity the results of which were
beneficial to world trade. EFTA was somewhat more remote from the
customs union rationale which was the underpinning of the EEC; but it was
difficult to limit the exception to "true" customs unions. 9 Moreover, once the
exception had been agreed to, ' it became necessary to extend favorable
34. GATT, Final Act, supra note 14.
35. GATT Press Release, supra note 15.
36. For a discussion of the formulas used by the GATT to associate the state trad-
ing economies of Poland, Romania and Hungary, see M. M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEST
TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM 91-98 (1978).
37. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. See also
WORLD TRADE, supra note 10, at 60; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS supra note 16,
at 401.
38. GATT supra note 1, art. XXIV; see generally WORLD TRADE, supra note 10,
§ 24.
39. A "true" customs union not only abolishes tariffs within the system, but ap-
plies a common external tariff; a "free trade association" need not necessarily have a
common external tariff.
40. GATT supra note 1, art. XXIV.
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treatment to such organizations in their preparatory stages, in anticipation
of their attaining customs union status.
It has generally been thought that the GATT exception in favor of
customs unions and similar institutional arrangements resulted in increases
in world trade without the imposition of excessive costs on those nations
outside the preferential systems, though on this point there have been
doubts."' Since the carefully and laboriously negotiated arrangements within
GATT, preferential arrangements of various sorts have proliferated. The
EEC has associated itself with many nation-states in preferential arrange-
ments. The Yaounde Convention42 and later the Lom agreements,"2 which
were approved in 1975 and reaffirmed in May, 1980, reinforced the
preferential treatment by the European Community of certain - but far
from all - developing nations. Prominent among those excluded from the
benefits of Lofi, are the nations of Latin America. The United States also has
a preferential arrangement, with Canada, in connection with automotive
products." The United States considered it necessary to apply for an
exception from GATT for this arrangement; however, Canada felt otherwise."
Many more such preferential arrangements of one sort or another exist. Even
within some of these arrangements, notably that of the EEC, special
arrangements prevail, such as the Common Agricultural Policy,46 which
tends to exclude the exports of nonmembers from European markets. Under
these circumstances, it is clear that, as Wyndham White remarked some
years ago, it would strain credibility to assert that most-favored-nation
treatment continues as a guiding principle of world trade. This is especially
so since the MTN Codes will undoubtedly increase the amount of world trade
within preferential arrangements.
Among developing nations, there has also been little doubt that
preferential arrangements were beneficial. Following the EEC example, the
41. For a general discussion of this issue, see S. RUBIN, Recent Trade Develop-
ments, supra note 26.
42. Yaounde Convention, July 20, 1963, J. 0. Comm. Eur. 1430 (1964); Second
Yaounde Convention, signed July 29, 1964, entered into force Jan. 1, 1971, 13 J. 0.
Comm. Eur. (No. L282) 6 (1970).
43. EEC Convention of Lom6, Apr. 1, 1975, 19 J. 0. Comm. Eur. (No. L25) 2, 41
(1976).
44. United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, entered into force
definitively Sept. 16, 1966; 17 UST 1372; T.I.A.S. No. 6093.
45. Canada did not require an exception since it extended the benefit to all other
Contracting Parties of GATT. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 16,
at 554.
46. The Common Agricultural Policy [CAP], implemented under arts. 9, 38-47
and 110 of the Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
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developing nations formed the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market, which were accepted
by the GATT with only the request that periodic reports be filed.47 Further
expansion of preferential arrangements is evident in the special bilateral
arrangements reportedly under negotiation between Brazil and Argentina."8
The negotiations will probably result in a commitment to gradual reduction
of trade barriers, not necessarily generalized to other nations. Within the
framework of the MTN itself, the developing nations are now holding talks in
Geneva. Whatever concessions are made will undoubtedly be limited to the
developing nations. As previously indicated, this accords with the now
general acceptance of the principle of "special and differential treatment",
illustrated by the GATT's acceptance of at least the principle, if not
necessarily the substance, of the Generalized System of Preferences.0
MFN has thus been under attack for many years, indeed one might say
from its very incorporation into Article I of the GATT.5' But in recent years,
exceptions have increased and widened. MFN may have been the cornerstone
of the GATT. It can hardly be said to be the cornerstone of the new
arrangements negotiated under the MTN.
3. Reasons for the Decline of Unconditional MFN.
In discussion of this trend, it must first of all be acknowledged that the
preservation of any principle may well require a certain flexibility, or
perhaps deviation, in its rigid application. The principle of free speech, for
example, would be threatened rather than enhanced if it were to include the
right to shout "Fire!" in a crowded theatre. Many of the departures from
strict MFN were and remain well-justified, and have contributed to the basic
efficacy of that principle as a means of increasing world trade for the benefit
of all.
Moreover, the compromises arrived at in Geneva, in the MTN, which are
clearly deviations from strict MFN, have rational economic underpinnings.
The MTN has set into acceptable international practice actions which reflect
what nation states have for some time considered to be their own national
requirements. It has taken account in a realistic manner of what nations do,
as well as what they say. And it has made, in many respects the least
47. See F. V. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 144 (1978).
48. See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA April 23, 1980, at 135.
49. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50. GATT Decision of June 25, 1971. GATT Doc. (L/3545), BISD 18th Supp. (April
1972), at 24. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS supra note 16, at 1016-1020.
51. Supra note 1, art. 1.
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possible deviation from broad application of MFN principles consistent with
basic preservation of those principles as an objective of international trade.
To say this is not, however, to escape the inevitable conclusion that MFN
is at present only one among several principles to which nations pledge some
degree of adherence. In the MTN, the nations have moved substantially away
from that principle which, when the GATT was put together, seemed the
linchpin of a cooperative and growing system of trade among nations.
What has happened?
First, as has been briefly stated above, 2 the MFN principle has been for
years progressively undermined by special arrangements. Whatever the
undoubted justifications of these arrangements, they have demonstrated that
many nations - not only developing countries - consider that there are
many situations in which MFN is not an appropriate national policy, and
therefore inappropriate for an international commitment. There has probably
been little question that the reasoning which led to enthronement of MFN
was correct, the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the early 1930s, with rabidly
protectionist tariffs and attempts to shift economic burdens to foreign
nations, were disastrous, in both the short and the long run, and that trade
liberalization would have benefits for all. But application of the MFN
rationale to specific circumstances, has indicated that increasingly numerous
exceptions would have to be made. Among the exceptions were, as previously
mentioned: 1) the regional preferences embodied in the EEC and EFTA; 3 2)
the special regional or bilateral preferences of the Yaounde and Lom6
agreements; ' 3) the Canadian-United States automotive agreement;' 4) the
eventual acceptance of the Generalized System of Preferences, which was
initially sponsored by UNCTAD.6 However meritorious the arguments for
these understanding and practices may have been, it became clear, by the
time of the MTN, that MFN was a principle honored as much in the breach
as in the observance.
Second, it has been increasingly apparent that clear distinctions cannot
easily be made between national and international policies, insofar as trade
effects are concerned. Trade with centrally directed economies tests the
principle of nondiscrimination. It is difficult to determine why trade in a
particular commodity with a centrally directed economy is limited. Among
the possible explanations are: the products sought to be exported to that
economy are over-priced; their quality is low; or consumer preferences are
52. See supra notes 47 through 50 and accompanying text.
53. Supra notes 38 through 40 and accompanying text.
54. Supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
55. Supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text.
56. Supra note 50.
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such that they are not being bought. Suspicion leads to the conclusion -
perhaps erroneous - that such trade is limited because there exists a central
buying authority under governmental direction."1 But if trade with centrally
directed economies tests application of the principle of nondiscrimination -
which lies at the heart of MFN - trade with nationalized industries, of
which there are more than several examples in Western market economies,
poses a similar problem. The way in which a national economy is organized
may thus affect profoundly the manner in which international trade flows,
even though the national measure does not purport to touch upon interna-
tional trade issues.
Other national policies also potentially affect trade. An obvious example
is the interrelation between environmental policy and trade. A legitimate
national measure, designed to protect the human environment, may affect
imports. Pollution controls on automobiles may in effect proscribe imports
from nations whose vehicles do not conform. Japanese prohibition of the use
of certain preservatives in effect imposes an embargo on the importation of
certain American agricultural products, which cannot be transported for long
distances without such preservatives. To complicate the matter, the danger of
these preservatives is debatable. Thus the issue arises, also, whether such
national measures are what they purport to be - legitimate enactments in
the national interest - or merely cunningly disguised trade barriers. In such
cases, principles of nondiscrimination may be difficult to apply.
In many other ways, measures taken by governments deeply affect trade,
without those measures being explicitly recognized or acknowledged as trade
measures. Thus, efforts to promote the development of economically less
developed regions of a country may involve such measures as tax deferment
or special credits. If the effect of such measures is to make it possible for a
manufacturing facility to be established, and to export, in a situation in
which it would not be able to do so in the absence of these measures,
manufacturers in the importing country may charge that the exports are
subsidized, and that such subsidization is an unfair trade practice. That, in
fact, is practically a statement of the famous Michelin case,58 in which
Canadian "developmental" measures were alleged by American competitors
to be a subsidy for Canadian exports. In the Michelin case, a very large part
of the output of the Michelin plant was destined for the American market.59
57. See generally M. M. KoSTECKI, supra note 36, at 43-60.
58. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, T.D. 73-10; 7 Cust. Bull. 11 (Janu-
ary, 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 1018 (January 1973).
59. Id. at 47, statement to the U.S. Commissioner of Customs on behalf of Miche-
lin Tire Manufacturing Corporation that 75 percent of its Canadian-made tires will go
to the United States.
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What would have been the result, or the argument, if only a part of those
exports were so destined, remains an open question.
That such questions are not confined to any one country is evident.
Extraordinary efforts, including low interest and guaranteed loans, have
been made in the United States in order to save a major automobile
manufacturer - Chrysler - from going out of business, and thereby
increasing an already very high rate of unemployment. If Chrysler now
exports, have its products been subsidized? Is such a subsidy, if it exists,
unfair?
Other questions, going far beyond the "simple" issues of tariffs or
outright quotas, also exist, and complicate issues of nondiscrimination and of
MFN. For example, concessional rates of interest are often offered by
governments or governmental agencies to exporters.' Are these an unfair
trade practice? In some cases, it is argued that constraints, hidden or
otherwise, on imports, divert third country exports unfairly. EEC limitations,
which effectively control Japanese exports to the European Community may
well have the double effect of increasing those exports to the United States
and of constricting United States exports to third countries. Most-favored-
nation principles, designed originally in a world which seemed to respond
better to classic economic formulations, may not provide adequate answers
here.
In some of these situations, in fact, the MTN has produced codes - to be
discussed later 61 - which do discard or deviate from MFN principles, in order
to deal with these issues. Such is the case in regard to governmental
procurement, 2 and with regard to the issue of subsidies and the remedies for
subsidization.6
A third reason for the demise of unconditional MFN is that application of
"classic" trade principles, including MFN, may be seen as not very relevant
to an increasingly important aspect of international trade - that is, the
intra-enterprise transfer of goods and services. Transnational enterprises, ie,
enterprises having branches or subsidiaries in many parts of the world, have
come to be an increasingly prominent part of the world trading scene. It is
not necessary to have a precise definition of the term "transnational
60. For example, to assist in the development of its steel industry, Japan allowed
its commercial banks to maintain 90-100 percent loan-to-deposit ratios and encour-
aged large loan grants to domestic steel companies. American Iron and Steel Institute,
Steel at the Crossroads: The American Steel Industry in the 1980s, at 76 (January
1980).
61. Infra note 73 et. seq.
62. Infra note 79.
63. Infra note 80.
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corporation" to realize that enterprises which are located in different
countries but which are related to each other by a common economic interest
may work out trade patterns different from those which they would work out
if they were completely independent and competing enterprises. When
enterprises are related, no matter what the form of such relationship, the
"unseen hand" of Adam Smith may affect their conduct less than does their
perception of their mutual interest. In such cases an enterprise may buy from
or sell to its related enterprise, even though pure competitive economics
would dictate a different course. Nor is this an insubstantial issue. Years ago,
it was estimated that "international business is now the dominant factor in
determining changes in the patterns of world exports ..."I Likely, transfers
between related units respond only imperfectly to the doctrine of comparative
advantage. If, as seems more than likely, such business is an increasingly
large part of world trade, MFN loses, for that large part of world trade, its
relevance.
Finally, the role of the developing countries has had and will have a
major impact on acceptance or nonacceptance of MFN as a general rule. It
has already been pointed out that the developing nations have always been
largely exempted from the rule of reciprocity and that of nondiscrimination.'
Part IV of the GATT' reflects their special situation, as does general
acceptance of "special and differentiated" treatment. But other issues have
arisen to muddy the waters. Commodity issues are complicated, though they
seem to present a case in which there is mutual benefit in arriving at
accommodation; and here, the approval of the Common Fund in Geneva in
June, 1980, seems an optimistic note in a not generally bright landscape. On
the other side - and most important for the developing countries - is the
rise of concern in the industrialized nations as to the effects on their
economies of competition from imports originating in the developing nations.
A number of developing countries have become important exporters.
Some are now classified by some experts as newly-industrialized-countries,
6 7
ready for what some have termed the "graduation" process. Whatever the
terminology, the underlying thought is that structural changes may be forced
upon industrial nations by increasing production in the developing nations.
To this thought may be traced sentiments that trade policy should not be the
64. Robock and Simmonds, International Business - How Big is it?, COL. J.
WORLD Bus., Jan-Feb. 1968, at 7; See also Rubin, Multinational Enterprises and
National Sovereignty - a Skeptic's Approach, 3 LAW AND POL'Y. INT'L. Bus. 1 (1971).
65. Supra note 18.
66. Supra note 19.
67. See OECD Report, The Impact of the Newly Industrializing Countries on Pro-
duction and Trade in Manufactures, (1979).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
determinant of industrial policy, or that curiously contradictory phrase,
coined in 1977 by the French Prime Minister, "organized free trade." The fear
of a rise in industrial capacity within the developing countries revealed by
this phrase is not unique. Where there have been industrial policy, or
structural, consequences in the industrial nations - enterprises put out of
business, rise in unemployment, etc. - it has been tempting to blame
imports from developing countries. But a number of studies indicate that
closures resulting from increased imports competition are not many, that
technological change is a far greater source of closures, and that the effects
have largely been limited to a few particularly vulnerable industries.'
A comparison of the figures over a five year period, using 1972 as one
base and 1976 as the other, shows that the United States, in 1972,
exported (in billions of U.S. dollars) $7.61 in manufactures to the
developing nations as against $6.13 in imports; the 1976 comparison is
$18.47 for exports and $14.82 for imports of such goods. 9 But . ..for
the European Economic Community, 1972 exports of manufactures to
the nori-oil developing nations were $12.79 billion, with imports of only
$4.23; 1976 exports of manufactures to those developing nations came to
$25.70 billion, with only $11.05 of imports. Japanese statistics reflect an
enormous excess of exports over imports in manufactures with the
non-oil developing nations: . . .for 1976, the export figure was $16.38
as against $3.52 of imports of manufactures from developing nations.7°
Defensive policies, designed to protect the economies of the industrial
nations from the exports of the developing nations, will do little but postpone
problems which will be all the more difficult to solve because of that
postponement. Inevitably, some defensive policies will be carried out:
unemployment resulting from imports which are subsidized, for example,
compels defensive policies, whether such policies involve countervailing
against subsidies, or so-called voluntary "orderly marketing agreements"
which rely upon an agreed quota,7 or even the "trigger price" mechanism by
68. Id.
69. Organization of American States Series Q/V.C-5, document CSI-38, August
1978, at 390.
70. Id.
71. "Orderly marketing agreements" are "voluntary" only in the sense that they
are self-imposed. They generally come about when an importing nation, due to domes-
tic problems, threatens to impose a quota on the exporting national unless that nation
agrees to voluntarily limit the offensive export. For a brief description and outline of
the history of "orderly marketing agreements," see MEYER supra note 47, at 98-103.
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which the United States has sought to protect its steel industry from unfairly
low-priced imports." But the figures of trade with the developing countries,
the comparative rates of growth in developing and developed nations, and
similar factors, all suggest that the solution is one of positive adjustment, of
structural changes which anticipate a growth in international trade, not its
restriction.
Such policies of positive adjustment will be far from easy, either to
design or to apply. It seems more than likely that such policies will have to
be tailored to individual situations. In that process, the guiding principle of
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment should be taken into account;
but , as is indeed demonstrated by the results of the MTN, it is clear that it
will not be regarded with the reverence which characterized an earlier and
perhaps simpler day. It will be relevant, but not decisive.
4. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations, more or less concluded in June,
1979, constitute a major change in international trade policies. One of the
most important aspects of that change is the return, in the MTN results, to
"conditional" MFN.
The technique of the MTN was to negotiate separate codes, directed
mainly to nontariff trade barriers. Six such codes were negotiated.7" Under
these codes, only signatories are fully entitled to the benefits of the codes,
though it is of course possible for signatories to extend their benefit to
nonsignatories. Every member of the GATT is legally able to sign any code.
72. See Twenty-Second Annual Report of the President of the United States on the
Trade Agreements Program 1977, at 74-75 (1978).
73. Although other specialized or bilateral agreements were also reached, it is
generally considered there six Codes negotiated under the MTN, supra note 13.
These are: (1) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, NTN/NTM/W/229/Rev. 1 [The Customs
Valuation Agreement], reprinted in MTN, pt. 1, at 3-65; (2) Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, MTN/NTMIW/211/Rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Government Procurement Code], reprinted in MTN at 67-189; (3) Agreement on Im-
port Licensing Procedures, done Apr. 10, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/231/Rev. 2, reprinted in
MTN at 191-207; (4) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, done Mar. 29, 1979,
MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev. 5, reprinted in MTN at 209-56; (5) Agreement on Interpreta-
tion and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/236 [hereinafter cited as Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement], reprinted in MTN at 257-304; (6)
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done Apr. 9, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/232 [Antidumping Agreement), reprinted in
MTN at 309-337.
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But until such signature, non-code GATT members are not entitled, as a
matter of right, to the benefits of each code. The United States Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 7  enacted to implement the MTN, has similar
provisions.
Fundamentally, the reason for this shift toward conditional MFN lies in
the nature of the codes themselves. The codes are designed to deal with
nontariff barriers - not with tariffs. Nontariff barriers (hereinafter NTBs)
are difficult to control. Unlike tariffs, they are not always visible. They often,"
involve "internal" national policies. Such policies often have a substantial
effect on trade; but their asserted objective is generally unrelated to trade.
The question of internal measures designed to facilitate economic develop-
ment, as in the Michelin case,"5 is a characteristic exemplar.In order to reduce
or to eliminate such NTBs nations must submit to cooperative discipline in
regulation of their own affairs. From the outset, it was clear that not all
GATT members were prepared either to negotiate or agree to international
examination of their conduct in these respects." In these circumstances -
limiting the benefits to Code members - the conditional form of MFN was
inevitable.
The MTN Codes are all conditional in one important aspect - that of
procedures designed to ensure compliance with the Codes." Problems arising
from a Code's operation are to be resolved by a committee made up of
signatories to that Code. Nonsignatories will, therefore, play little or no role
in discussion of the interpretation or implementation of each Code. There is
some possibility that dispute resolution may carry over into GATT
procedures, 8 but basically, administration of each Code is left to the
signatories to that Code.
In addition, two of the most important of the MTN Codes are conditional
not only in their procedural but also in the substantive provisions. These are
the Codes having to do with Government Procurement 79 and with the related
subjects of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. °
74. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 2, 93 Stat. 144 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Trade Agreements Act] (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2503).
75. Supra notes 58 and 59 and accompanying text.
76. See HUFBAUER, ERB AND STARR, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-
Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAW AND POL'Y. INT'L. Bus. 59, 67 (1980).
77. Id. at 68.
78. Id.
79. Agreement on Government Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/
211/Rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as Government Procurement Codel, reprinted in MTN
supra note 13, at 67-189.
80. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/236
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The Government Procurement Code was designed to open up to foreign
competition the markets on products purchased by governments or gov-
ernmental agencies.8' Here reciprocity was considered essential, though
signatories feed not follow that requirement." The Code contains detailed
rules, mainly designed for "transparency" of procurement practices.' It is
applicable only to relatively large purchases - in excess of 150,000 Special
Drawing Rights. 4
The United States legislation implementing the Government Procure-
ment Code in fact provides for extension of the rights granted under the Code
to certain categories of nonsignatories. One important such category is the
"least developed countries," to which Code treatment is freely extended.85 But
it is not likely that such countries will benefit in any major sense from the
opportunity to sell what is generally rather sophisticated industrial equip-
ment. The United States implementing legislation also provides that Code
treatment can be extended to nonsignatories who, without signature, provide
procurement opportunities to U.S. products and suppliers." This provision,
which looks to the reality rather than to the legal situation, is addressed to
nations which do in fact provide more or less reciprocal opportunities, but
which for various reasons - perhaps difficulties with the procedural aspects
of the Code - may not wish to sign. But the United States Congress, in
enacting this provision, has also suggested that it be used sparingly, in order
to induce as many nations as possible to become signatories. Moreover, as if
to counter balance this evidence of liberalism, the Trade Agreement Act also
permits the United States to bar a nonsigntory from U.S. procurement;
previous law merely enacted preferences for American firms, but did not
permit such an absolute bar.
(hereinafter cited as Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agreement (or Code)], re-
printed in MTN supra note 13, at 257-307.
81. Government Procurement Code, supra note 79, preamble, cls. 5-8.
82. Id., art. III, para. 11, reprinted in MTN, at 77.
83. In regard to government procurement, "transparency" means visibility of the
procurement process.
84. Government Procurement Code, supra note 79, art. 1, para. 1(b), reprinted in
MTN at 73. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a creation of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and serve as a unit of account for international reserve assets. 150,000
SDRs is approximately $190,000 (estimate is from Trade Agreements Act of 1979;
Statements of Administrative Action, H. R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 465). For a discussion of SDRs, see note, Administrative Survey: October 1977 to
September 1978, 11 LAW AND POL'y. INT'L. Bus. 375-81 (1979).
85. Supra note 79, § 301(b) (4) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b) (4)).
86. Id. § § 301(b) and (3) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b) (2) and (3)).
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The Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agreement," as pointed out,
deals with a very complicated area of economic measures. Two major issues
- aside from the difficulty of defining a "subsidy" - were involved: one was
the U.S. practice of "countervailing" against any subsidy, without regard to
proof that the subsidy had caused injury; the other was the growth of
practices designed to provide incentives for exports. Others wanted the
United States to limit countervailing duties to cases of proved injury;88 the
United States, among others, sought provisions more closely defining what
measures were to be considered subsidies. The Code responds to these
negotiating objectives. It leaves many questions unanswered; but this is not
the place for a detailed examination of the Code provisions, or their
interpretation.
Arguably, conditional MFN treatment under the Code can be reconciled
with provisions of the GATT, despite the contradiction with Article 1.88 In
general, countervailing measures under the Codes, designed to offset "unfair"
trade practices, such as dumping or subsidization, can be applied under
Article XX of the GATT' to individual offending exports, so long as
application does not result in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." In
other instances as well, applications of the Code may give rise to claims of
conflict with GATT provisions. For example, where bilateral commercial
agreements contain unconditional MFN provisions, is a Code signatory
required to extend its Code advantage to a nonsignatory bilateral treaty
partner? These questions, perhaps especially for the United States, are likely
to be a fertile source of dispute. Conceivably, some such discussion may result
from attack on the concept of conditional MFN under the terms of the GATT
itself.
It is clear that the Multilateral Trade Negotiations have moved the
world substantially away from the GATT's general avowal of unconditional
MFN in substantial areas of world trade. The tendencies of previous years:
the formation of regional trading blocks; the extension of preferences to
various assortments of nations; the grant of special nonreciprocal benefits to
developing nations; all contributed to the renewed scepticism as to whether
unconditional MFN was indeed a meaningful principle. It may be that the
acknowledgement of these difficulties in the MTN, and the attempt to deal
87. Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Agreements, supra note 80.
88. See generally R. RICHARDS, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 12 LAW AND PO'Y.
INT'L. Bus. 1447, 1465-1495 (1979).
89. Supra note 1, art. I.
90. Supra note 1, art. XX.
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with them openly, will contribute to the objective of a fair and growing world
market system. But in the meantime, the MTN establishes two different sets
of rules, applicable to trade between different groups of nations. Signatories
to the Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Code will have one set of rules
applied to their trade, nonsignatories will have different rules applied to
theirs.
In explicit terms, this means that the United States - which until the
Code had been legally free to countervail against subsidies without any
finding of injury9 - will be compelled to prove injury before countervailing
against an alleged subsidy applied by a signatory;92 the old standards will
apply to nonsignatories. Thus if France, as a signatory, provides an export
subsidy, countervailing measures could not be applied unless injury were
found to exist. If, in contrast, Mexico or Brazil, both industrializing countries
but nonsignatories, were to provide such a subsidy, countervailing would be
automatic. Since few developing countries are signatories, this difference
may have significant consequences, especially in view of the wide range of
measures which may be considered, 6 la Michelin, to be subsidies.
Special provisions are contained in the Codes for developing countries,
which are designed, at least in part, to make adherence to the Codes easier.
The Codes all contain general language stating that in application of their
terms consideration be given to the developmental, trade and financial needs
of the developing countries. 3 This general language aside, there are also
some more explicit provisions. The Subsidies Code, for example, allows
developing countries to apply subsidies to the export of minerals and
manufactures, but in such a manner as not to cause "serious prejudice" to the
trade or production of another signatory. 4 The Code also contains an
obligation to "endeavor" to work toward elimination of export subsidies when
continuation of such subsidy is inconsistent with the competitive and
91. See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 9, § 303(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)
(1976). Since this provision for applying countervailing duties without a finding of
injury predated the GATT provision (supra note 1, art. VI, para. 6), which prohibited
such action, under the GATT exception for legislation "existing" at the time of signa-
ture of the GATT (GATT supra note 1, art. I para. (b)), the United States had been free
to maintain its policy of "automatic countervailing."
92. The proof of injury test was actually the GATT rule for all major GATT signa-
tories except the U.S. by virtue of art. VI. GATT, supra note 1, art. VI. As a result of
the Codes, the United States agreed to waive its "existing legislation" exception and
abide by the GATT rule.
93. See for example, Government Procurement Code supra note 79, art. III, para.
1, reprinted in MTN at 75.
94. See the Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Code supra note 80, pt. I1, art. 14,
para. 3.
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developmental needs of the developing country signatory. 5 Additionally, it
would still be possible for the importing country to countervail against
subsidies which do in fact cause injury." If the subsidy is not directly applied
to exports, but is a so-called "domestic" subsidy, countermeasures may be
taken in a limited but important number of situations - where injury is
caused in the importing country, for example.97 The Government Procure-
ment Code, in contrast to the Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Code,99
has no special provisions applicable to developing countries other than the
general exhortation to take account of developing country circumstances. 100
Despite provisions such as the Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Code,
Argentina is the only developing country which signed the concluding proces
verbal. The six Codes ' negotiated in the MTN would seem to have little
chance of substantial developing country participation. The door which has
been held open to developing countries may not present a very inviting
prospect, though there are some obvious advantages in so entering. Perhaps
the advantages offered are not sufficient to induce developing country
participation. Renewed efforts must be made. Trade now involves a world
market that has grown to nearly "$1.4 trillion per year, and includes
one-sixth of everything grown or manufactured on this earth."'0 2 The fact of
interdependence is too obvious to need emphasis.
CONCLUSION
It may be that MFN, in its GATT usage, has become outmoded, and that
the conditionality emphasized by the MTN is essential to the preservation of
a viable world trading system. It would be more than unfortunate if this
effort to deal with real problems were to engender a series of divisive steps
rather than the rapprochement which circumstances require. Among the
multitude of issues, many are delicate and painful. For example, Europe
charges that American chemical exports are subsidized by artificially low oil
prices in the United States; United States industry retorts that European
steel exports are the product of industries which are heavily subsidized. A
trade war is hardly what is needed - for anyone, perhaps least of all the
developing countries.
95. Id. para. 7.
96. Id. para. 7.
97. Supra note 80, pt. III, art. 11, Subsidies other than export Subsidies.
98. Supra note 79.
99. Supra note 80.
100. Supra note 93.
101. Supra note 73.
102. See Strauss, Foreword to Symposium on the MTN, 11 LAw AND POL'Y. INT'L.
Bus. 1257 (1979).
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It would seem to be fully recognized that the principle of most-favored-
nation treatment still has an important role to play, and that the bilateral
myopia of the 1930s - the desire to balance trade with each nation - must
be avoided. According to a speech made by Ambassador William Brock at an
ABA Trade Institute on April 21, 1981, the United States is now in its 60th
consecutive month of balance of trade deficit. Clearly, a major part of the
current U.S. balance of payments crisis is attributable to rather special
causes, as for example, the deficit with the oil producing countries, alongside
of which the imbalance with Japan, much bruited in the press and Congress,
dwindles considerably. Bilateralism has been tried; and it has failed. It is to
be hoped that the continuing discussions, which are necessary to complete
and complement the MTN, will contribute to accommodation.
One way of avoiding polarization is to work toward expansion of the system
set up under the MTN, with particular emphasis on adjustments which will
make possible the full participation of the developing countries. A committee
of the United States Congress, in recommending legislation to implement the
MTN, stressed the fundamental importance of the "central principle" of
most-favored-nation treatment, and the need to avoid the "bilateral myopia"
of the 1930s. It can only be hoped that the discussions which are following
the MTN will contribute to the necessary measures of accommodation.
